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IN THE SUPBEME COUBT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. P. KOCH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13850

BBIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a suit to recover money allegedly owing for
labor and material furnished pursuant to a construction
contract. Suit was filed under the provisions of Section
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUBT
The court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendantappellant J. C. Penney Company in the amount of $56,147.97 with interest from February 22, 1972 at the rate
of six percent per annum until date of judgment, and
thereafter at the rate of eight percent per annum. The
lower court also entered an Order Conditionally Staying
Enforcement of the Judgment. From such judgment and
order defendant appeals.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and a
judgment in defendant's favor as a matter of law or in
the alternative a mandate that the case should be tried.
Defendant also seeks an order declaring the condition
2
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contained in the Order Staying Enforcement of the Judgment to be void.
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S
On about June 6, 1970, the defendant J. C. Penney
Company entered into a contract with the defendant
Skyline Construction Company for the erection of a store
building in Bountiful, Utah. Skyline Construction Company was the general contractor for the project. On
or about August 31, 1970, Skyline Construction Company entered into a subcontract with the plaintiff J. P .
Koch, Inc., by the terms of which the plaintiff was to
furnish materials and to perform labor incident to the
general mechanical portion of the construction of the
defendant Penney Company's building. The general
contract, as originally signed, required that Skyline Construction Company furnish a bond to guarantee payment
of bills for labor and material furnished in the construction of the building. On or about September 18, 1970,
the bond required was deleted from the general contract.
In performance of the subcontract, plaintiff furnished material and labor for the construction of the
building of the defendant J. C. Penney Company of a
reasonable value of $583,086.00. Upon completion of the
contract, according to the books of the defendant Skyline Construction Company, there were backcharges or
other lawful offsets against such amounts of material
and labor in the sum of $2,160.64, leaving a net amount
of $580,925.36.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In accordance with the provisions of the general
contract between the defendant J. C. Penney Company
and defendant Skyline Construction Company, progress
payments were made by Penney Company to the general
contractor from time to time as work progressed. In
accordance with the contract and the general conditions
thereof, payment requests were accompanied and supported by lien waivers from various subcontractors and
materialmen, which waivers in most instances, showed
the total amount of money received by each of the individuals (E.95-104). Under date of October 31, 1971,
plaintiff furnished a lien waiver acknowledging receipt
from the general contractor, on account of work performed and material furnished of $569,608.34 (R.104).
In reliance on the lien waivers so furnished, the defendant J. C. Penney Company paid to the general contractor,
Skyline Construction Company on account of the mechanical work performed the total sum of $569,608.34.
The defendant J. C. Penney Company admitted in its
answer on file herein that there remained due and owing the sum of $11,317.02 and paid such amount to the
Clerk of the Court as a tender of all amounts owing.
By its answer, the defendant Skyline Construction
Company admitted that it owned to the plaintiff the sum
of $56,147.97. Skyline Construction Company is now
insolvent.
The plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. At the hearing thereon, the depositions taken
in the case were ordered opened and published. On
November 29, 1973 the Court granted plaintiff's Motion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and entered a Partial Summary Judgment (R.30-32).
Subsequent thereto and under the date of January 9,
1974, and Court entered an Amended Partial Summary
(R.26-28), in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant J. C. Penney Company in the amount of $56,147.97 plus interest thereon from February 29, 1972 at
the rate of 6% per annum until entry of judgment and
thereafter at the rate of 8% per annum (R.26).
The Amended Partial Summary Judgment expressly
finds that in reliance on the total figures in the lien
waiver, defendant J. C. Penney Company "paid to defendant Skyline Construction Company the sum of
$569,608.34 shown on the last lien waiver upon which
disbursement was made, which leaves due and owing
from J. C. Penney Company to the plaintiff the sum of
$11,317.02, exclusive of interest'' (R.27, par.7).
The court further finds that the defendant J. C.
Penney Company "could not justifiably rely on the lien
waivers or the figures contained therein and said reliance is not a defense" (R. 28), and reserved for future
determination the validity of the claimed backcharge.
Under date of April 22, 1974, the defendant J. C.
Penney Company filed a Motion to Stay the Enforcement of the Judgment and upon hearing, the Court entered an order conditionally staying the enforcement
thereof (R.ll-12). The conditions were that interest on
the judgment should run from June 6,1974 on the principal and then accrued interest:
"at the current prime rate calculated by averaging the daily rate for each month and that rate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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will be applied for each month from June 6, 1974
until the date of payment of any judgment awarded to the plaintiff" (R.ll)
and that the defendant Penney Company pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $11,317.02 together with interest at
6% per annum, being the sum the defendant Penney
Company had admitted was still owing and unpaid on
the total subcontract. Subsequent to the entry of the said
order, the defendant J. C. Penney Company did pay the
sum of $11,317.02 together with interest as shown by the
Partial Satisfaction of Judgment signed by the plaintiff's attorney (RIO).
Subsequent thereto and under date of September 11,
1974 the defendant J. C. Penney Company and the plaintiff settled and compromised the issue as to the claim of
offset and all of the parties stipulated and agreed that
the Amended Partial Summary Judgment should be
declared to be and become a final judgment on the date
an order was signed by the Court (R.7-8). Under date
of September 11, 1974 the Court signed an order providing that as of the date thereof the Amended Partial Summary Judgment should be and become the final judgment in the case. The defendant J. C. Penney Company
thereupon filed Notice of Appeal.
POINT I
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 14-2-2
U.C.A., 1953 IS NOT ABSOLUTE
The basis of plaintiff's suit is the liability imposed
by Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 which provides as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons
who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall
be commenced within one year from the last date
the last materials were furnished or the labor
performed.'
I t is clear in the plaintiff's Memorandum of Authorities submitted to the lower court in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment that plaintiff's contention
is that liability under this statute is absolute. The lower
court appears to follow this argument since in paragraph 8 of the Amended Partial Summary Judgment
(R.28) it is stated:
" J . C. Penney could not justifiably rely on the
lien waivers or the figures contained therein, and
said reliance is not a defense to the claim of the
plaintiff.'' (Emphasis added)
The statute itself as quoted verbatim above does not
appear to impose absolute liability and plaintiff has cited
no cases from Utah or other jurisdictions so holding.
This court has stated that decisions interpreting
Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953, known as the bonding statute,
and Section 38-1-3 U.C.A., 1953, known as the lien statute,
deal with the same or similar rights and, therefore,
cases decided under one statute are applicable in determining the application of the other. The first such deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cision was Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 50
U. 114, 167 P.241. This was an attack on the constitutionality of the statute imposing liability on the owner
for failure to require a completion bond. (Now Section
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953.) The court held that the statute was
constitutional and stated at page 124 Utah reports:
"The statute of Utah now under review is auxiliary to our mechanics' lien law and just as much
in aid of it as if it had been made a part of it and
incorporated in the same chapter . . . under the
bond statute, he (the owner) must take care to
exact the bond and under the lien statute, he must
take care to hold the fund." (Parenthetical phrase
added.)
In King Brothers, Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kilne Company,
13 U.2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 it was stated:
"Because of the common purposes of these lien
and contractors' bond statutes and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what
is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper application of the latter."
To the same effect, see also Crane Company v. Utah
Motor Park, Inc., 8 U.2d 413, 335 P.2d 837.
Keeping in mind then the applicability of cases decided under the materialmen's and mechanics' lien statute to the bonding statutes, there are a number of decisions of this court. Factual situations similar to the
present case have been considered on several occasions.
In Zions First National Bank v. Reginald L. Saxton,
et al., 27 U.2d 76, 493 P.2d 602, the owner, defendant
Saxton, obtained a loan from plaintiff to do certain conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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struction on a five acre tract of land. Shortly thereafter
the owner advised the contractor that construction was
to be expanded to include a twenty acre tract. As work
progressed, the owner and the contractor, as an inducement to plaintiff to advance funds, executed a certificate
that the labor and materials were used in the construction. Upon receiving checks, they endorsed the same
below language stating that they waived and released all
lien rights. The contractor claims a lien on the original
five acre tract and also on the additional fifteen acres.
In deciding the matter, the Court cited Holbrook v.
Webster's Inc., as controlling and said:
"In signing a lien waiver Hamilton waived all
liens for the work done, and it matters not that
unknown to the plaintiff bank some of the work
for which money was received was performed on
the 15-acre tract."
In Holbrook v. Webster's, Inc., 7 U.2d 148, 360 P.2d
661, the contractor had signed a request for funds directed to a lender and on the same document was a receipt and lien release which recited that it was delivered
to the lender to induce it to make payment of the stated
sum and that the materialmen waived, released and discharged any lien or right to lien that he then had or may
thereafter acquire against the real property described
in the document. This Court stated:
"We are of the opinion that no genuine issue of
fact is presented by the lien release. The only
issue is one of law. It does not lie in the mouth
of appellant to say that he was mistaken in the
legal effect of the release or that he did not inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tend that it should be given the only legal effect
of which it is susceptible."
The supplier had filed an affidavit stating that the release was only intended to release the property so far
as the receipted amount is concerned. Going on the court
said,
"The release is susceptible of only one meaning
and absent fraud cannot be varied except by
agreement of the parties."
A summary judgment entered below denying the materialmen a lien right was affirmed.
In West v. Pinkston, 44 U. 123, 138 P. 1152, plaintiff
entered into a subcontract to do brick work on a dwelling
house and after completion of the work the general contractor delivered* his personal check to the plaintiff for
the agreed price. Plaintiff delivered a receipt for payment so that the contractor could obtain the money due
the owner on the contract price. Thereafter, the contractor delivered the receipt to the owner and relying
on the receipt and the contractor's representation that
he had paid the plaintiff, the owner paid the contractor.
The contractor failed to deposit the check from the owner
and refused to pay the same or any part thereof to the
plaintiff. Suit was brought to foreclose a lien against
the property. In deciding that plaintiff was entitled to
no relief, the court said at page 129 Ut. R e p :
"Appellant (plaintiff) therefore clearly authorized as well as induced the respondent to pay the
contractor the $850.00 which, but for the receipt of
appellant, she undoubtedly would have paid to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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him. After having induced respondent to pay the
money, we cannot see how appellant can complain.
In legal effect, she paid the money as directed by
him, and he must look to the contractor and not
to her for the same. Respondent thereafter had
a right to deal with all others who had any claim
upon her as though appellant w^as out of the case."
Going on the Court said:
"We remark that this conclusion is based upon
the undisputed facts that the appellant issued
the receipt to the contractor with the understanding and for the purpose that he should use the
same to obtain the money due to appellant as
subcontractor from the respondent; that it was
fully understood between the appellant and the
contractor that the latter had no money in the
bank to pay the check, but that such money had
to be obtained from the respondent; and that the
receipt was to be used as a means to obtain the
money. Upon these facts, we think the appellant
is clearly estopped from making any further
claims against the respondent under the statute."
The Court quoted an early Missouri case, Cote, etc.,
Brick Co. v. Sadring,

68 Mo. App. 15:

"A material man, who executes a receipt of payment in full to the contractor for material furnished for a building, for which he sues the owner,
who honestly and without any negligence on their
part paid the contractor upon the faith of such
receipt, is estopped from saying that the acknowledgment of payment is untrue."
Although West v. Pinkston is an old case, it appears
from Shepherd's Citator not to have been overruled or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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modified and is still the law in the State of Utah.
I t has, in fact, been specifically held by this Court
that liability under Section 14-2-2 is not absolute. In
Apex Lumber Company v. Commanche
Construction
Company, 18 U.2d 119, 417 P.2d 131, in affirming a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the property
owners, the Court said:
"Apex urges that (1) the evidence shows Apex
supplied material for which it was not wholly
paid. Apex is right, but this is not controlling,
since such an argument would insure it against
any nonpayment which it itself help to produce,
as was the case here. Further it says (2) that
under the statute it has a cause of action for the
unpaid value of the material. Equally this is true,
unless it was particeps in creating a defense for
its opponents, as was the case here."
In plaintiff's memorandum in support of the summary judgment, the statement is made that the bond was
deleted, "without the knowledge of J. P. Koch, Inc." This
statement seems to imply that Penney Company should
have notified Koch of the deletion. It is respectfully submitted that under the factual situation herein set forth,
plaintiff is in no position to complain of the absence of
the bond. The court's attention is respectfully directed
to the final paragraph of Section 14-2-1 U.C.A., 1953:
"The bond herein provided shall be exhibited to
any person interested, upon request."
I t is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff had an
obligation on its part to ascertain that in fact a bond had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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been secured as required by the contract, and that it was
sufficient in form and amount.
The defense raised by Penney Company is based on
the fact that the conduct of the plaintiff itself resulted
in plaintiff's loss. Such defense would be equally valid
and available to a bond surety. See Chicago Bridge and
Iron Company v. Reliance Insurance Company, 46 111.
2d 522, 264 N.E.2d 134, wherein it was held that a subcontractor who executed waivers of liens without receiving payment from the general contractor would not be
allowed to recover on a bond against a non-consenting
surety. To the same effect is Crane Company v. Parker
Construction Company (Mass) 247 N.E.2d 591, where
the Court held that a supplier's agent who gave a heating
subcontractor a certificate to the effect that he had been
paid for boilers furnished was estopped from asserting
a claim against the general contractor and the surety that
he had not been paid since the general contractor relied
upon the certificate to its detriment, and the general contractor obtained payment for the amount of the boilers.
This was the holding notwithstanding the fact that the
subcontractor's check representing payment for the boilers was subsequently dishonored. The Court went on to
say that the contractor had no duty to make certain that
checks had been honored before relying on the certificate
of the supplier.
I t is respectfully submitted that the law in the State
of Utah is clear that where a subcontractor or supplier
executes and delivers to the general contractor a lien
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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waiver knowing that the owner will rely thereon in making payments to the general contractor, the signer of the
lien waivers is estopped thereafter to claim a lien or to
contend that he has not been paid the amounts shown in
such lien waiver. This estoppel operates to barr a cause
of action under Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS JUSTIFIED IN
RELYING ON THE LIEN WAIVERS
The record shows that the general contract contained
a detailed plan for making progress payments, and that
this plan was followed (Peterson deposition, ps 5-8).
Under this plan, payment requests were submitted periodically by the general contractor. These requests show
the percentage of completion for the various trade categories, the amount previously paid on each account, and
the amount claimed as presently being due. Payment
requests were supported by lien waivers from each of
the subcontractors in the various trade categories. The
amount on each lien waiver was to at least equal the
amount paid on the previous payment request.
Plaintiff was aware of this requirement. In his
deposition, Gordon Neiderhauser, co-owner of the plaintiff corporation, said he knew that the lien waivers were
required, to support the payment requests, and also that
defendant Penney Company would rely on the waivers
in making disbursements to the general contractor. (Neiderhauser deposition, p.14, line 25 through p.15, line 13.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Neiderhauser identified the lien waivers submitted (R. 95-104) as having been signed by him. He
further testified that some of the figures written on the
lien waivers were in his handwriting and some were not.
He could not recall in all instances whether or not the
figures had been filled in at the time he signed the lien
waivers. He freely admitted that in some instances signed waivers were left with Skyline Construction without
dollar figures filled in, stating that "I assumed that
Penney's or Skyline would put in the amount based on
their estimate or my estimate to them". (Neiderhauser
deposition p.15, line 11). Although he had a copy of the
estimate of the value of work completed, he did not take
it with him or consult it in filling in any of the amounts
on the lien waivers, but simply relied on Skyline to fill
in the correct amounts (Deposition, p.16).
Charles D. Peterson, the architect on the project,
was asked about the lien waivers submitted. At page 41
of his deposition is a series of questions regarding the
accuracy of lien waivers. The witness stated that:
"Every single time I receive a lien waiver and it
states on there that an amount of money has been
paid, I have always believed that that was a true
representation of the monies that had actually
been paid by the general contractor to the sub."
Further on the same page the witness stated that he was
not aware that any of the lien waivers were a misrepresentation of the facts. He was not aware that Skyline
had required subcontractors to submit lien waivers in
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advance of
stated that
practice in
not believe

payment. On the following page the witness
he was not aware that this was a common
the construction industry, and that he could
that it was.

It is clear from Peterson's deposition that he had
no way of knowing what amounts had actually been paid
by the contractor from each construction advance to the
various subcontractors. Of necessity he relied on the
amounts shown as having been received in the lien waivers submitted by each subcontractor. This is not an unreasonable assumption or reliance. The subcontractors
were in the best position to know what funds they had
received from the general contractor on the job at any
given time.
In oral argument and in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff
relies heavily on the fact that there was a discrepancy in
the figures contained in two of the lien waivers, Exhibits
7 and 8 (B.101-102). Peterson testified that upon receipt
of the lien waiver, Exhibit 8, with a lower figure than
for the previous month, he mentioned this fact to Penneys
(Deposition p.30, lines 19-25; p.40 lines 1-14).
On the foregoing state of the record, the court erred
in three respects in holding that the defendant Penney
Company was not justified in relying on the lien waivers.
1. Plaintiff admits, at least for the purpose of the
Motion for Summary Judgment, that Penney Company
paid to the general contractor $569,608.34 on account of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the mechanical subcontract. This is the precise amount
of the last lien waiver (R.104). Reliance on the figures
contained therein is obvious. The court, in fact, found
in its Memorandum Decision that, in fact, Penney had
relied on the lien waivers.
Plaintiff represented by the lien waivers that a specific sum of money had been paid on account of work
done. At the time the waivers were furnished, plaintiff
knew that the defendant Penney Company would rely on
the amounts shown therein as paid in making progress
payments to the general contractor.
Notwithstanding these facts, the plaintiff not only
made no effort to see that the amounts shown were correct and accurate, but left these amounts blank to be
filled in by the general contractor. Having this constituted, the general contractor, its agent to complete
the figures, the plaintiff should be estopped to deny the
correctness of such figures.
2. The discrepancy in the figures shown on Exhibits
7 and 8, as mentioned above, occurred in August, 1971.
The last lien waiver was submitted in October of that
year. During September a waiver was submitted and
payment received, and following that the October waiver
payment requests were submitted, and payment was
made.
The lower court apparently held, as a matter of law
that because two of the lien waivers submitted, in a series
of ten, over a period of eight months contained inconDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sistent figures, none of the lien waivers could be relied
upon. It is respectfully submitted that such finding,
particularly when it is on a Motion for Summary Judgment, is not proper or supported by the evidence.
3. The judgment of the lower court on this matter
was based on the record as presented, the pleadings, Answers to Interrogatories and depositions. On the question of the reasonableness of defendant Penney Company's reliance on the lien waivers, the defendant had
no opportunity to present evidence. This is a factual question: Was the reliance reasonable? The trial court determined such question in the negative, without affording
Penney Company an opportunity to present evidence to
the contrary.
It is respectfully submitted that such determination
on a Motion for Summary Judgment under the circumstances set forth above, was erroneous, and at the very
least, the matter should be remanded for a trial.
POINT III
THE FIRST CONDITION CONTAINED
IN THE ORDER STAYING ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT IS VOID
On July 22, 1972, the Court entered an Order Conditionally Staying Enforcement of the Judgment upon
two conditions (R.ll). The first condition was:
"That in the event judgment is finally awarded to
the plaintiff, interest thereon shall run on the unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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paid balance at 6% from May 26,1972 until January 9, 1974, and from said date at 8% per annum
until June 6, 1974 and thereafter on the principal
and then accrued interest at the current prime
rate calculated by averaging the daily rate for
each month, and that rate will be applied for each
month from June 6, 1974 until the date of payment of any judgment awarded to the plaintiff."
The second condition was that the defendant pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $11,317.02 with interest. This condition has been met as shown in the Statement of Facts
herein. Since the defendant J. C. Penney Company always admitted that this amount was owing, such condition is not objectionable.
Section 15-1-4 U.C.A., 1953 provides as follows:
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum."
Under the provisions of this statute, the court was
without power or authority to direct that a judgment
should bear interest at any other than the statutory 8%
per annum. Speaking of interest on judgments, this
Court said in Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union No.
976, Joint Council 67, Western Conference of Teamsters,
16 U.2d 85, 386 P.2d 47, "this interest follows the judgment as a matter of law and would be collectable even
though the judgment did not so provide".
In 45 Am. Jur. 2d at p. 67 it is stated:
"The rate of interest on judgments generally is
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prescribed by statute. Such a provision is controlling and the rate prescribed cannot be reduced
by reason of equitable considerations". Geier v.
Tjaden (N.D.) 84 NW.2d 582 and Carter v. McHaney (Tex. Civ. App.) 373 SE. 2d 82.
Also cited in support of the statement that interest may
not be reduced by reason of equitable considerations, is
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 292 Ky. 351, 166 SW. 2d 860, 144
ALR 866. In that case a statute provided that a judgment shall bear legal interest from its date. The legal
rate at that time by statute was 6% per annum. The
lower court took judicial notice that interest rates in the
commercial world had greatly decreased and even 2%
was regarded as a good yield. It then construed the statute as expressing a legislative intent to limit interest
on judgments to a maximum 6% and make a less rate
legal interest. In a memorandum decision the lower
court held it inequitable that Court obligations should
carry a rate of interest altogether out of proportion to
the earning of money generally. On appeal the court
held:
"The statute is too plain and definite we think
to afford the interpretation that it but declares
a maximum rate of interest . . . Although the
judgment in this particular seems fair and just
under existing conditions, economically speaking,
we are constrained to hold the Chancellor was
without authority to provide other than that the
judgment should bear 6% interest."
Not only did the lower court provide for a floating
rate of interest, but provided for compound interest by
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stating that after June 6, 1974 interest shall run "on the
principal and then accrued interest".
As stated in 45 Am.Jur.2d, p.71:
"Although compound interest generally is not allowable on a judgment, it is established that a
judgment bears interest on the whole amount
from its date, even though the amount is in part
made up of interest. . . "
In Dezen v. Slater off, (Fla.) 65 S.2d 484 the court
said:
"The principal sum, that is, the amount of the
initial judgment . . . is not disputed, but interest
is. The court evidentially allowed interest compounded yearly. This was error. The plaintiff
was entitled to simple interest only."
Also, in North Drive-Inn Theater Corporation v.
Park Drive-Inn Theater, Inc., et ah, (10th CR, 1957) 248
F.2d 232 it is stated:
"It is the general rule that a judgment bears interest on the whole amount thereof, although such
amount is made up partly of interest on the original obligation and even though the interest is
separately stated in the judgment."
As stated in Johnson v. Hazen, 333 Mass. 636, 132
NE.2d391,54ALR2d810:
"A judgment bears interest from its date, although the amount of the judgment in part is
made up of interest."
If the rule is as stated in Kaufman v. Kaufman,
supra, that interest may not be reduced below that speciDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fied by statute, the converse should likewise be true that
interest may not be increased. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court was without authority or
jurisdiction to increase the interest above the statutory
rate.
Even were this not the case, it is submitted that the
provision for interest "at the current prime rate calculated by averaging the daily rate for each month" is
impossible of computation. The judgment is silent as
to what is meant by current prime rate, and it is a matter of common knowledge and, therefore, within judicial
notice that the prime rate charged by banks in the eastern
United States is frequently, if not always, different
than the prime rate charged by local banks, and the judgment offers no guideline or formula by which this interest may be arrived at for the purpose of calculation.
It is respectfully submitted that the first condition
in the order staying enforcement of the judgment is void.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant-appellant J. C. Penney Company. Liability under Section
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 is not absolute, and the cases clearly
hold that one claiming under such statute is barred from
recovery if his own conduct is relied upon and causes
the loss in question.
The finding of the lower court that defendant-appellant J. C. Penney Company could not justifiably rely
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on the lien waivers submitted, should be vacated as being unsupported by the evidence and as having been
made without the opportunity for the defendant-appellant to present evidence.
The condition attached to the Order Staying Execution of the Judgment, which provides for interest at
more than the rate set forth in the statute, Section 151-4 U.C.A., 1953, should be declared to be void as being
in excess of the jurisdiction and power of the District
Court.
In the alternative, this matter should be remanded to
the District Court with directions that the same should be
tried.
Respectfully

submitted,

WALLACE D. HURD
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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